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[ (Frisch 1926b) ]. Pawel Ciompa seems to emphasise too much the descriptive side of what is now called econometrics.
In the above quote, Frisch in effect points to the fundamental difference between the two conceptions of econometrics, which shall constitute a central concern of this paper. Should we think about econometrics as being merely descriptive, as Ciompa did, or can we reasonably attach more to its meaning and scope, following Frisch and the majority of modern economists?
First of all, Ciompa's vision of econometrics is presented in the next section of this paper, followed by a discussion of Frisch's conception of the term, which essentially represents the modern mainstream view. Thereafter, a central point of criticism against the modern interpretation of econometrics from the point of view of Austrian economics is discussed and illustrated by means of a computer simulation. The lack of constancy in economics that the Austrians stress, suggests a return to a more Ciompanian view. It is however important to make clear from the outset that I do not subscribe to Ciompa's theory in all its details. The point I wish to emphasize and support is that Ciompa thought of economic theory as being prior to, and more fundamental than, econometrics, which is based on economic theory, but does not provide the means to alter it. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
Pawel Ciompa's Conception of "Oekonometrie"
Polish economist Pawel Ciompa (1867 Ciompa ( -1913 was a professor at the Higher School of Economics in Cracow and director of accounting at the federal state bank of Galicia based in Lemberg. The full name of his home region was Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria and the Grand Duchy of Cracow with the Duchies of Auschwitz and Zator. It was also known as the Halychyna or Austrian Poland and was part of the dual-monarchic Austro-Hungarian Empire at that time. Hence, "ruler of Galicia and Lodomeria" was part of the ceremonial titles of the princes of Hungary. Today the region belongs partly to Poland and partly to the Ukraine. Its former capital Lemberg is today called Lviv and part of western Ukraine, whereas Cracow lies in Southern Poland. 3 
Ciompa published his German language book Grundrisse einer Oekonometrie und die auf der
Nationaloekonomie aufgebaute natürliche Theorie der Buchhaltung (Outline of econometrics and the natural theory of accounting based on economics, from now on simply referred to as Grundrisse) in 1910, in which he defended an economic, as opposed to a juridical, approach to the theory of accounting (Mattessich 2008, p. 270) . In the Grundrisse, one finds the earliest mention and definition of the term econometrics, more precisely, its German language equivalent "Oekonometrie" (also "Ökonometrie"), as far as we know. Ciompa describes the new term vividly:
Just like mechanical, acoustical, dynamic, and other such phenomena in physics, and mass phenomena in geometry, also economic phenomena should be represented and displayed following a doctrine, which I envision as a sort of economographics. This economographics would constitute a descriptive economics; it would have to be based on economics, mathematics and geometry. The foremost task of such a doctrine would be the geometrical representation of value. This part of economographics I call econometrics. The practical application of econometrics to the mathematical representation of values and their changes would be accounting. Put differently, econometrics would then just be the theory of accounting.
[emphasis added] 3 Econometrics in Ciompa's vision, and what it adds to the more general field of economics, would therefore be strictly descriptive in nature. Its purpose is to describe and depict the changes and evolution of economic values. More specifically, he thought of it as being a collection of mathematical and graphical tools by which we could describe and depict the evolution of assets and liabilities in business accounting. He further explains the scientific status of economographics and econometrics as follows: 3 All quoted passages from the Grundriss in this paper have been translated by myself. In the German original (Ciompa 1910 , p. 5) we read:
Wie die mechanischen, akustischen, dynamischen und dgl. Erscheinungen durch die Physik oder wie die Massenerscheinungen durch die Geometrie, so sollten auch die volkswirtschaftlichen Erscheinungen durch eine Lehre, die ich mir als eine Art Oekonomographie vorstelle, zur Darstellung gebracht werden. Diese Oekonomographie waere eine Art darstellende Nationaloekonomie, sie muesste auf der Nationaloekonomie, Mathematik und Goemetrie aufgebaut werden. Einer solchen Lehre wuerde dann vor allem die geometrische Darstellung des Wertes zufallen. Diesen Teil der Oekonomographie nenne ich Oekonometrie. Die praktische Anwendung dieser Oekonometrie auf die mathematische Darstellung der Werte und deren Veraenderungen ist dann die Buchhaltung. Umgekehrt ist dann die Oekonometrie nur die Theorie der Buchhaltung.
In the remainder of the paper, the original German quotations only are provided, when my English translations are running the risk of becoming too inaccurate for a proper understanding of what Ciompa actually wrote.
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Next, Ciompa makes the twofold distinction of value into use value and exchange value, both of which can be either of subjective or objective nature.
5 From these distinctions he obtains the terms subjective use value that is assigned to a good in accordance with the subjective importance of the wants that it satisfies, subjective exchange value, which is assigned to a good in accordance with the importance of the wants that can be satisfied by those goods that can be obtained in exchange for it, objective use value that describes the factual or natural scientific potential of a good to satisfy wants, and objective exchange value, which is simply the market value or the price of the good as the result of the subjective evaluations of buyers and sellers. Ciompa further points out, that value is not inherent in the good, but contingent on needs, inclinations, the economic situation of the individual, and also the social environment. It is therefore subject to constant change, and the only way to reliably gain information about the value of a good is through exchange. It is then the objective exchange value with which accounting is primarily concerned (p. 4).
What Ciompa defines as the normal value [Normalwert] of a good or service corresponds to its cost of production. A rent or a profit is earned whenever the realized objective exchange value on the market exceeds the normal value. A loss is incurred whenever the realized objective exchange value is below the normal value of the good.
In order to be able to uniformly quantify and express objective exchange values, profits and losses, Ciompa has emphasized the importance of money and money prices. xxxiii), which is of course the exchange value, and then bluntly emphasized the indissoluble connection between price and exchange: "The law of Price, in fact, contains the law of Exchange Value." (p. 132) Furthermore, Menger (2007 Menger ( [1871 , p. 257) has presented an account of the emergence of money as just another good with certain properties from the original state of barter exchange.
7 The careful reader realizes that at least a person's own labor according to the proposed definitions must be seen as a part of wealth, as it falls under the definition of services and therefore is an economic good.
8 It is clear that in practice, and from a broader perspective, it might be very difficult to decide what a productive use of wealth is -an argument which has been brought forward against the idle resources argument for macroeconomic policy interventions during crises and recessions. However, for Ciompa's purposes, it seems, the concepts are sufficiently well defined, as we could relatively easily find out which economic goods are used, and therefore constitute capital, in any specific and well-defined economic action, for example, the production of a wooden chair. Notice, Ciompa considered capital to be a negative quantity, hence the minus sign in the equations, which is intuitively plausible, because capital is the part of the wealth that is put to productive use, and hence, is used up in the production processes. We assume an initial wealth endowment of V 1 =K6, which corresponds to a potential capital of -C 1 =K6, from which v 1 =-c 1 =K3 is used up in a hypothetical economic action. Figure 1 illustrates the situation so far. (Ciompa 1910, p. 14) 8 that the action yields new wealth of v 2 =K4, which corresponds to new potential capital ofc 2 =K4. Figure 2 shows the complete econometric Quadrigon for this case.
The upper left side in Figure 2 also The complete economic action, including its cost, v 1 , its revenue, v 2 , as well as the corresponding gain, v 2 -v 1 , can also be documented in rather mundane wealth and capital accounts, and it certainly is subject to debate, whether this might not, after all, be the more sensible way of presenting "the 9 yields from wealth and capital". 11 As mentioned above, wealth is considered a positive value and capital is negative. Hence, in the wealth account, we find initial wealth and revenue on the debit side [Soll] , and the costs and net total on the credit side of the account [Haben] . For the capital account, we have the inverse arrangement.
Debit wealth account Credit 1) initial wealth
C3+c1= K10 C1+c3= K10 The two tables correspond to Fig. 21 and Fig. 22 in Ciompa (1910, p. 17) .
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this basic example of an economic action. He adds a couple of complications, such as variations in the per unit price of goods, or in the quantity of goods (like losses from inadequate storage), and explains how these cases enter into his econometric accounting scheme. Ciompa also presents an econometric Quadrigon that captures more than one economic action of selling and buying certain quantities of a good. The graphical representation thereby becomes increasingly complicated as illustrated in Figure 3 .
Part III [Bewertung des Kapitalvermögens in der Bilanz
] covers the balancing of accounts and some criticism of accounting rules and practices in Austro-Hungary and Germany at that time.
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Ciompa emphasizes again, that accounting and econometrics must be based on economic theory, and in particular on the economic theory of value (p. 134).
As pointed out in the introduction of the paper, my purpose is neither to describe nor to defend Ciompa's work in every detail. I believe that there are many shortcomings and inaccuracies in his exposition. However, without evaluating his doctrine in its specificities, the important point that merits emphasis is that his conceptions of econometrics and economographics are entirely descriptive. They are attempts to build upon economic theory, without transforming it. Thus, it stands in sharp contrast to the modern conception of econometrics, which is discussed next.
Ragnar Frisch and the Modern Conception of Econometrics
The celebrated originator of the modern conception of econometrics is Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch (1895 -1973 , who was the first recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics together with Dutchman Jan Tinbergen in 1969. Needless to say, we know much more about the life and work of Ragnar Frisch than we know of Pawel Ciompa.
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Frisch was born in Oslo, as the only child in a family, whose ancestors were mining specialists from Freiberg, Saxony. They had been recruited to work in silver mines near Kongsberg during the regency of King Christian IV of Denmark-Norway (1588-1648). His grandfather founded a jewelry firm in 1856, which was taken over by his father. Frisch himself was expected to continue the family tradition in gold and silver manufacturing and started an apprenticeship in a larger goldsmith firm in Oslo. Supported by his mother, who felt that the profession would not be satisfactory for her son in the long run, Frisch took up a study program in economics at the University of Oslo at the same time. He chose economics because it was "the shortest and easiest study" (Frisch 1970c ). It took him only two years.
After having finished his undergraduate studies in economics in 1919 and his apprenticeship in 1920, he left Norway to visit France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States in order "to study economics and mathematics in earnest" (Frisch 1970c ). The academic community in France must have had the greatest impact on his intellectual development. He wrote: "During my stay of nearly three years in France, I got so familiar with the conditions there that ever since, when I get to visit France, I somehow feel that I have 'come home again'." (Frisch 1970c ) He earned his PhD. in mathematical statistics from the University of Oslo in 1926 (Frisch 1926a) , the same year in which he published his first academic paper in the field of economics -a paper that "would deserve a place in the history of economics, even for no other reason than the opening sentences" (Bjerkholt 1995, p. xiii) . In the first lines of this French language essay, published in a Norwegian periodical under the title "Sur un problème d'économie pure", 14 Frisch famously defined the allegedly new discipline of "économétrie":
Intermediate between mathematics, statistics, and political economy, we find a new discipline, which, for lack of a better name, may be called econometrics.
It is the aim of econometrics to subject abstract laws of theoretical political economy or 'pure' economics to experimental and numerical verification, and thus to turn pure economics, as far as possible, into a science in the strict sense of the word. Intermédiaire entre les mathématiques, la statistique et l'économie politique, nous trouvons une discipline nouvelle que l'on peut, faute de mieux, désigner sous le nom de l'économétrie.
L'économétrie se pose le but de soumettre les lois abstraites de l'économie politique théorique ou l'économie 'pure' à une vérification expérimentale et numériques, et ainsi de constituer, autant que cela est possible, l'économie pure en une science dans le sens restreint de ce mot. (Frisch 1957 (Frisch [1926b , p. 79)
16 After Irving Fisher had arranged a visiting professorship from his personal funds, Frisch came to Yale University in the early 1930s. In one of his lectures, he praised astronomy as being one of the most scientific fields, as "astronomical observations are filled into the theoretical structure […] Economic theory has not as yet reached the stage where its fundamental notions are derived from the technique of observations." (Frisch 1930, ch (1965 [1911] , p. 146)]: measure the variations of the marginal utility of economic goods. We consider in particular the variation of the marginal utility of money. (Frisch 1957 (Frisch [1926 In his Nobel Memorial lecture, delivered after 44 years of an academic career as Norway's leading economist, professor and director of the Institute of Economics at the University of Oslo, cofounder of the Econometric Society and editor of its journal Econometrica, he refers again to Jevon's dream of being "able to quantify at least some of the laws and regularities of economics", and claims that, "since the break-through of econometrics -this is not a dream anymore but a reality." (Frisch 1970a, p. 12) What then did the break-through look like? How did the dream become true?
Frisch understood that the quantification of economic concepts and theory was a necessary condition for the application of natural scientific methods to economics. These methods require 17 According to Bjerkholt (1995) , Frisch's two great mentors were Marshall and Wicksell (he refers to Frisch 1950 Frisch , 1952 . Apparently, their books were the only really worn-out ones in his personal library. Frisch credits Marshall for having combined the Walras-Jevons-Menger subjective notion of value with the cost of production viewpoint (Frisch 1970a, p. 16) . He specifically refers to Menger as the head of the Austrian economists, but misspells his first name as Karl instead of Carl. Karl Menger (1902 -1985 , son of Carl Menger, was a mathematician and probably more after Frisch's fancy. Obviously, Frisch was more drawn towards the formal mathematical presentation in Walras (1874) and Jevons (1965 Jevons ( [1871 ), rather than the entirely verbal presentation in Menger (2007 Menger ( [1871 ). For an interesting de-homogenization of these three thinkers, see Jaffé (1976 (Fisher 1892, p. 3) . Although, Walras and his successor at the University of Lausanne, Pareto, both made important contributions to the mathematical formalization of economic theory in general, and value theory in particular, it is important to note that Pareto rejected a cardinal interpretation of value and utility, but thought of them as being ordinal, and, in fact, based his famous welfare economics on ordinal utility (Aspers 2001) . In this respect, Frisch departed from Pareto. Indeed, listing these economists as intellectual influences is not to suggest that they all would have celebrated Frisch's work in every respect.
observability and measurability, ideally on cardinal scales. Methods of experimental and numerical verification (or falsification) could not simply be applied to classical economic theory, as the underlying core concepts possess no independent existence in the observable external world, and its conclusions only take the form of qualitative or even counterfactual laws.
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The first task, therefore, is to redefine economic concepts in terms of variables and indicators that are at least in principle observable and measurable, which allows the derivation of quantitative economic relationships. Frisch, in the spirit of neoclassical economics, based this redefinition on a mathematical axiomatization of human behavior that has become so widespread that every undergraduate student of economics today learns certain forms of it in microeconomic classes under the headings of rational behavior, utility maximization and homo oeconomicus. This axiomatization comprises, for example, the well known assumptions of determination, additivity and transitivity of preferences. 20 Utility or value is not described as an abstract psychic phenomenon, which is ultimately taken as a given, not to be explained further, but rather as a well defined mathematical function of a vector of consumer goods.
Hence, utility is just understood as a mapping from multidimensional bundles of consumer goods, which are observable as they have some form of physical existence, to some cardinal scale of measurement. The critical aspect, of course, is the determination of the mapping. In Frisch's view, the fact that the mapping is merely assumed into existence should not cause too much concern. He was convinced that it was determinable, in principle, through choice questions [expériences par interrogation] posed to the respective individuals (Bjerkholt and Dupont 2010, pp. 39-45; Frisch 1957 Frisch [1926b Frisch ], p. 81, 2013 Frisch [1933 , Lecture 1). 21 He undoubtedly recognized that there were conceptual problems with the idea of inferring cardinal utility measurements from (hypothetical) interview data, and that, in fact, only ordinal rankings could, in principle, be determined. However, the auxiliary assumption of cardinality was often justified "with an appeal to 'everyday experience.'" (Bjerkholt and Dupont 2010, p. 39) These assumptions, which are extended in similar ways to the production sphere of the economic system, allow for a deductive mathematical derivation of a model framework that contains The attempt at quantification in econometrics comprises two aspects of equal importance.
First, we have the axiomatic aspect, i.e. an abstract approach which consists in establishing as far as possible logical and quantitative definitions and to construct from the definitions a quantitative theory of economic relations. Then we have the statistical aspect, here we use empirical data.
We try to fill the boxes of abstract quantitative relationships with real numerical data. We try hard to show how the theoretical laws manifest themselves at present in this or that industry or for this or that consumption category, etc. The true unification of these quantitative elements is the foundation for econometrics. (Frisch 2013 (Frisch [1933 , Lecture 1)
Thus, in his response to Professor Lulek, Frisch (1936, p. 95 ) defines econometrics as the "unification of economic theory, statistics, and mathematics". At the heart of this unification are the underlying axioms and assumptions that comprise the mathematical model framework. These assumptions can be altered to the discretion of the econometrician, the only ultimate restriction being the laws of formal logic. It is of course indispensible, to ask on which grounds one set of 16 underlying assumptions can be declared superior to another set of assumptions. At best, they only provide approximations to the real world, but how could their plausibility be judged?
According to Frisch (2013 Frisch ( [1933 , Lecture 1) it is "by the subsequent agreement of the consequences of the axioms with reality that we can judge the plausibility of them." This view
anticipates the instrumentalist methodology of Friedman (2008 Friedman ( [1953 ), which has become the most influential methodological view in 20 th century economic thought (Hausman 2008, p. 33) .
It is clear, that econometrics in the modern instrumentalist sense is of a completely different caliber than Ciompa's econometrics. Whereas the latter, strictly speaking, does not attempt to contribute any new theoretical knowledge to the existing body of economics, but merely tries to illustrate and convey information based on it, the former concept of econometrics tries to change the method of economic reasoning, and therefore the whole nature of the discipline. Ciompa's econometrics is merely a matter of style and pedagogy and must be judged accordingly. Yet, the transformation of economics, which Frischian econometrics strives for, and has to a large extent successfully brought about, opens itself to all kinds of fundamental criticisms, and must in fact be defended and justified on methodological and epistemological grounds. We shall have a closer look at Frisch's justification, as well as a critique of his econometrics from the perspective of Austrian economics in the next section.
Frisch's Epistemological Views and the Case for a Purely Descriptive Econometrics
In justifying the theoretical and empirical quantification of economics, Frisch makes an important claim: "As long as economic theory still works on a purely qualitative basis without attempting to measure the numerical importance of the various factors, practically any 'conclusion' can be drawn and defended." (Frisch 1970a, p. 17) Let (x 1j ,x 2j ) denote the j-th pair of observation of variables x 1 and x 2 . Given n pairs of observation, the transformation can be written in matrix algebra as:
⋮ ⋮ a a a a = ⋮ ⋮ Now, as the transformation matrix is chosen to be arbitrarily close to a case of singularity, that is, a case in which the rank of the matrix is equal to 1, the absolute value of the correlation coefficient between the transformed variables can be pushed arbitrarily close to 1, regardless of the initial random set. This is a trivial mathematical insight. Let us consider some concrete numerical examples.
We randomly generate 100 pairs of observation, independently from the standard normal distribution for x 1 and the uniform distribution between zero and one for x 2 . As one would expect, the correlation between x 1 and x 2 is very close to 0 (r=0.02) as shown in the upper right panel of Figure 4 . The randomly generated 2x100-matrix is then transformed in three different ways, using the following transformation matrices: = a = 1 a = 2 a = 0 a = 4 , = a = 1 a = 2 a = 1 a = 4 , and = a = 1 a = 2 a = 2 a = 4 .
The only difference between the matrices lies in the value of coefficient a 21 , which gradually increases, from 0 to 1 and finally to 2. The last transformation matrix is singular, since it has a rank of 1. This is the case, because the second column vector of T 3 is equal to the first column vector multiplied by two. In other words, the two columns of the matrix (or the two rows for that matter) stand in a direct linear relationship. Using this transformation matrix leads to a situation, in which the observation of y 2 is always exactly double the observation of y 1 . 23 Hence, a perfect linear correlation (r=1) is generated as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 4 .
23 Assume the first two random pairs of observation were (x 11 =1.5, x 21 =-0.6) and (x 12 =0.2, x 22 =0.4). Applying T3 leads to the following transformed observations: (y 11 =1x 11 +2x 21 =1.5-1.2, y 21 =2x 11 +4x 21 =3-2.4) = (y11=0.3, y21=0.6) and (y 12 =1x 12 +2x 22 =0.2+0.8, y 22 =2x 12 +4x 22 =0.4+1.6) = (y12=1, y22=2). In general, y 2i = 2x 1i +4x 2i = 2(x 1i +2x 2i ) = 2y i1 holds, and hence, no matter what the initial random data, the transformation leads to a straight line with slope 2. It should also be obvious that, simply by choosing a different singular transformation matrix, we enjoy full freedom of changing the slope. If we had = 1 −3 2 −6 instead, the slope would be -3. The transformations generated by T 1 and T 2 are intermediate cases. However, already the first transformation leads, from a case of no correlation (original random sample), to one in which the correlation coefficient has increased to r=0.87, which would be considered a fairly strong empirical relationship by any social scientist. The second transformation matrix as it approaches the special case of singularity leads to an even higher correlation of 0.97. […] the essence of the situation is that even if the observations x 1 and x 2 are spread all over the (x 1 x 2 ) diagram in any way whatsoever, for instance in a purely chaotic way, the corresponding values of y 1 and y 2 will lie on a straight line in the (y 1 y 2 ) diagram when the transformation matrix is of rank 1. If the slope of this straight line is finite and different from zero, it is very tempting to interpret y 1 as the "cause" of y 2 or vice versa. This "cause", however, is not a manifestation of something intrinsic in the distribution of x 1 and x 2 , but is only a human figment, a human device, due to the special form of the transformation used. (Frisch 1970a, p. 13) Frisch does not provide a numerical example to illustrate his point, which helps in keeping up the appearance of scientific sophistication. In fact, it is absolutely inadequate to talk about something like a "cause" at all. Sticking to our previous numerical example, the transformed variable y 2 will always be exactly equal to y 1 multiplied by two, by definition. The transformation is equivalent to merging the two initial random variables into one, and then defining the other as the merged variable times two. It really boils down to saying that y 1 is the cause of 2y 1 , which is, whatever y 1 may stand for, not an explanation of variable y 2 (= 2y 1 ), but a mere definitional tautology.
More importantly, the singular transformations y 1 and y 2 have completely lost their relation to the initial random data. There is no way to get back from the transformed data to the original random sample, since one dimension, that is half of the complexity, has simply been erased from the picture. The singularity of T 3 means that there exists no inverse matrix, T 3 -1
, such that T 3 T 3 -1 = I, where I denotes the 2x2 identity matrix. 24 Hence, there is no matrix, which could be multiplied by the transformed data set in order to obtain the original random sample. So, if (x 1 , 24 The transformation matrices T1 and T2 have inverse matrices, so that it is always possible to go back to the initial data from the transformations. For example: = 1 2 0 4 1 − 1 2 0 1 4 = 1 0 0 1 = .
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x 2 ) is the underlying "ultimate reality", as Frisch likes to think about it in his metaphor, then, the singular transformation (y 1 , y 2 ), which has generated perfect order out of chaos, seems to be rather useless as it has completely lost its connection to this reality. A conclusion drawn from the transformed data would have no real meaning.
But what if the transformation is not singular? Frisch (1970a, p. 14) explains:
Suppose that the distribution of (x 1 x 2 ) is unknown and arbitrary with the only proviso that it
shall not degenerate into a straight line […] . We can then indicate a nonsingular linear transformation of the variables x 1 and x 2 which produce as strong a correlation in (y 1 y 2 ) as we please.
This is true because we can choose a transformation matrix, which is infinitesimally close to a singular matrix, but not quite yet there. It has been illustrated in Figure 4 . In such a situation the transformed data preserves all the complexity of the initial random sample and it can always be retransformed by inversion. Yet, the apparent structure that has been created is again only of a tautological nature. By definition, the transformed data is created out of the same elementary factors x 1 and x 2 . We can generalize our numerical example as follows:
Obviously, as ε tends toward zero, that is, as the transformation matrix approaches singularity, y 2 approaches 2y 1 and their correlation coefficient tends towards 1.
Be that as it may. Even accepting Frisch's metaphor so far and assuming that the transformation in effect provides us with a meaningful relationship that seems to be, in some way or another, exploitable for the betterment of humankind in a fundamentally chaotic "ultimate reality", there remains another fundamental problem. What happens when chaos changes its mind? If the ultimate reality really is chaotic, any nonsingular transformation that has previously led to a sufficiently strong empirical relationship might explode if chaos has its way.
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Let us illustrate the point as well as we can. 25 Assume that the transformation T 1 had been found by painstaking scientific enquiry by the most brilliant minds in Frisch's metaphorical world.
Given the data shown in the upper left panel of Figure 4 , the scientists have unleashed an underlying empirical relationship (r=87) by using T 1 , that seems to be robust after repeated testing. 26 The point of the following example is to show, that this scientific success was possible only in so far as the underlying "ultimate reality" was ordered in some sense in the first place, and hence not fundamentally chaotic.
Notice again, the generation of the random data set in Figure 4 was based on the standard normal distribution, which has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, for variable x 1 , and the uniform distribution between the lower bound of zero and the upper bound of one for variable x 2 . In other words, the parameters, which determine the exact shape of the probability distributions, have been fixed beforehand. Now what if "real chaos" sets in and the parameters of the distributions, that is, the mean and the standard deviation of the normal distribution as well as the lower and upper bounds of the uniform distribution, become random variables themselves? Figure 5 shows an illustrative example. The second random set also contains n=100 observations for both variables from the same families of probability distributions. After every 10 th pair of observation, the configuration of the distribution parameters has randomly changed. 27 As a result, the correlation coefficient after transformation of the random set has reduced from 0.87 to a mere 0.15. The previously robust empirical relationship between y 1 and y 2 has vanished. The sobering conclusion from this little simulation exercise is that statistical induction from empirical observations requires some structure, i.e. some constants that do not change. In a "chaotic" world, where there are no such constants, we can obtain structure only by using a singular transformation, that is, by ignoring the true nature of the world, or the subject matter, whatever the field of scientific enquiry may be. Had the scientists in the Frischian world inductively concluded that they found a true law, a constant, structural and quantitative relationship between y 1 and y 2 , and had possible social, economic, or political conclusions been drawn on the basis of that relationship, who knows where it would lead to when the structural change sets in? This change has been illustrated by the passage to a different simulation have been randomly changed. After the simulation of a sample of size n=100, all observations have been divided by 10, in order to bring them roughly onto the same scale as the observations in the previous simulation.
mechanism in which the parameters of the probability distributions have become random variables themselves.
In his example, Frisch regards the transformations as representing the progress of the sciences in finding regularities:
Science considers it a triumph whenever it has been able by some partial transformation here or there, to discover new and stronger regularities. If such partial transformations are piled one upon the other, science will help the biological evolution towards the survival of that kind of man that in the course of the millenniums is more successful in producing regularities. If "the ultimate reality" is chaotic, the sum total of the evolution over time -biological and scientificwould tend in the direction of producing a mammoth singular transformation which would in the end place man in a world of regularities. (Frisch 1970a, p. 15) In his vision, Frisch sees man as being capable of creating reality himself, independent of the constraints that some underlying "ultimate reality" may have. This really seems to be a matter of semantics. One might counter with a simple stipulation, which even has a slight instrumentalist notion: all creations of man, that serve their purpose, and a fortiori, all creational powers of man, must be rooted in reality. It has been pointed out above that, within the boundaries of Frisch's example, any singular transformation loses its relation to the initial data set. It loses its relation to reality, so to speak. A "mammoth singular transformation", under these circumstances, seems to be a rather scary idea.
The above simulation examples are just an illustration of the critique that Austrian economists have leveled against the modern mainstream conception of econometrics (Hoppe 1983 (Hoppe , 2006 (Hoppe [1993 (Hoppe ], ch. 10, 2007 (Hoppe [1995 (Hoppe ], 2010 (Hoppe [1988 Mises 1933 Mises , 1962 Mises , 2007 Mises [1957 ). The essence of their critique is that inductive statistical methods require some constancy in the way that perceived causal factors exert their effects, in very much the same way as the robustness of the empirical finding in the first simulation example, depended on the constancy of the parameters of the underlying probability distributions. For inductive statistical analysis, that is some kind of verification or falsification of hypothetical-theoretical statements, to be possible in the first place,
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the constancy principle must be satisfied. It holds that the same observable causes always lead to the same observable effect and that different effects must be the result of different causes (Hoppe 1983, p. 11 ).
Whether we think of "cause" merely as a "human device" as Frisch suggested, or something more fundamental, is irrelevant. Now, to the extent that the constancy principle is not actually satisfied, but is simply assumed to be true, the scientist runs the risk of drawing conclusions that are unwarranted, which is of particular importance in politically relevant fields such as economics, not so much in a field like astronomy. Formulating economic theory based on quantitative models in order to derive quantitative economic relationships, testing those relationships and thereby assuming constancy in one way or another may be seen as a kind of approximation from the true complexity of the underlying problem. It is of utmost importance to think about the consequences of such approximations. In order to do that, one has to reflect on the nature of the underlying problem that is approximated.
In fact, Frisch conceived of econometrics as being essentially an approximation. In a letter to F.
C. Mills from 21 February 1928, he explains in a somewhat peculiar manner:
We engage in this kind of approximation work without knowing exactly what we are trying to approximate. We engage seriously in target shooting without having any target to shoot at. The target has to be furnished by axiomatic economics. The axiomatic process of target making must necessarily be rather abstract, a fact which accounts, perhaps, for its lack of popularity in these days when it is considered quite a virtue to disregard abstract thinking in economics. It is abstract, but neither in the sense of a logic game nor in the sense of metaphysical verbiage, of which we have had some in economics, at times. Axiomatic economics will construct its quantitative notions in the same way as theoretical physics has constructed its quantitative notions. (cited in Bjerkholt and Dupont 2010, pp. 31-32) Frisch is giving the impression that the mathematical axiomatization of economic theory 29 is a free floating concept, detached from reality, a veritable singular transformation. This is not to argue about the puzzling question of free will (Rothbard 2011, ch. 1) . It might be true that human action from some remote point of view is in fact completely determined, taken all possible causal factors into account (Mises 2007 (Mises [1957 , p. 1). However, it is simply not the case, that a certain configuration of those "causal factors" that are commonly considered in econometrics always leads to the same actions, or at least to the same changes in the external world, as results of possibly different actions -not even on average or in some other probabilistic sense. Modern econometrics is only capable of working on a rather superficial level of accuracy,
given the amount and diversity of potential causal factors that could shape human action and that are completely out of reach for the econometrician and for any other scientist. On this level, substantial structural change is a well known empirical fact.
30
The present work deduces the entire corpus of economics from a few simple and apodictically true axioms: the Fundamental Axiom of action -that men employ means to achieve ends, and two subsidiary postulates: that there is a variety of human and natural resources, and that leisure is a consumers' good.
In fact, this might exactly be the kind of "metaphysical verbiage" that Frisch refers to. Action itself is an unobservable concept, and hence, useless from the point of view of Frischian econometrics. Certain consequences of actions are observable, such as the movement of the human body or the rearrangement of objects in the external world, not action itself.
30 One of the most prominent and important cases in modern macroeconomics that provide a well-known example for what has been considered a structural change, is the relationship between price inflation and unemployment. The stagflation of the 1970s has led to a rejection of the large-scale Keynesian macroeconometric models à la Evans and Klein (1967) , Klein and Goldberger (1955) or Klein (1964) that were essentially elaborated IS-LM models augmented with a politically exploitable Phillips Curve (Webb 1999) . Interestingly, Hurtado (2014) gathered empirical evidence that the modern New Classical and New Keynesian DSGE models (Galí and Gertler 2007; Galí 2008; Woodford 2003 ) that emerged out of the New Classical Critique (Lucas 1983 (Lucas [1976 ) would not have performed much better, if they had been used back in the 1970s instead of the old models. True enough, those models suffer from the same fundamental problems.
27
Not the verification or falsification of economic theory, that is, the generalization of empirical facts, but rather the finding of empirical facts is the proper role of econometrics. As long as modern econometricians engage in unwarranted generalizations, the "cycles of empiricism and rationalism" in economics that Frisch (1930) refers to are likely to continue. Sooner or later those generalizations may yield unsatisfactory conditions if put into practice, which induces a renunciation from empiricism, in the same way as deranged theoretical propositions may induce a return to empiricism. Frisch himself has seen the danger of econometrics becoming more of a "playometrics" (Frisch 1970a ).
The "new fusion of theory and observation" that Frisch called for could be found in a purely descriptive econometrics, that recovers the empirical facts and problems, which then have to be explained by economic theory. A particularly important field for econometrics would then be economic history (Mises 2007 (Mises [1957 ). Many of the statistical techniques that modern econometricians have developed are completely compatible with such a more Ciompanian conception of econometrics. In particular, his broader conception of economographics as "descriptive economics" could be developed further into this direction.
Concluding Remarks
In the first part of this paper, Pawel Ciompa's (1910) concept of a purely descriptive econometrics that is closely related to the theory of accounting has been presented. It is important to notice that econometrics for Ciompa was a mere application of economic theory, not a way to develop it further. In sharp contrast, the modern Frischian conception of econometrics, which has been discussed subsequently, calls for a reformulation, even a genuine Although the two conceptions share a common element, namely the descriptive side of statistical analysis, it is the inductive side of modern econometrics that puts them far apart. Even from Frisch's own perspective, it is clear that modern econometrics is an approximization as many other scientific enquiries. The crucial question is of course, how far should one approximate?
How much are we willing to abstract from what is considered to be real? The answer to this question may lie outside of the confines of the discipline of economics itself.
It was Joseph A. Schumpeter (2006 Schumpeter ( [1954 , part I, ch. 4) in his History of Economic Analysis, who stressed the role and inevitability of ideology in economic analysis. According to him ideology enters economic analysis at the very start, in the "preanalytic cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytic efforts", which he would also refer to as the "Vision." (p. 39)
Schumpeter explains:
Analytic work begins with material provided by our vision of things, and this vision is ideological almost by definition. It embodies the picture of things as we see them, and wherever there is any possible motive for wishing to see them in a given rather than another light, the way in which we see things can hardly be distinguished from the way in which we wish to see them. (p. 40)
It thus seems as if the question that we have dealt with at the heart of this paper is precisely one of ideology or vision. How do we look at the world, and more importantly, how do we look at man?
29
Ragnar Frisch was convinced that econometrics is in fact a set of tools for solving social and economic problems (Frisch 1944) as it provides the guidelines for economic planning. Having Pawel Ciompa's vision of econometrics and economographics, as a descriptive economics, in mind, I would suggest that it should rather be seen as a set of tools for identifying and describing the empirical manifestations of social and economic problems, nothing more and nothing less.
The solution of these problems, if they are solvable at all, must ultimately come from reason.
